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8
THE EUROPEAN UNION EMISSION TRADING
SCHEME
Marco Piovan
By rat ifyin g th e K yoto Protocol, the European Union (EU) agr eed to redu ce em issions
of gr een ho use gases by R perc ent 111 the period 20 0R- 20 12, co m pared to 1990 levels. The
m ain to o] th e EU has d eveloped in order to meet such requirem ent is th e Emission Trading
Scho lle (ETS) . The EU ETS is a cap and trade system that affects m o re th an 40 per cent o f
th e EU carbo n dioxide emissions.
The purpose o f this paper is to show how the European ETS has been d evelop ed and
ana lyze its m echanism s, Following the initial proposal of th e Green Paper or l C rccnuous: Cas
Emissions Tradillg (2000), th e EU ETS started operating 111 th e ye ar 2005. The outcome is
the result of a bargaining process between national and EU in stitutio ns and businesses, with
a leadin g ro le tak en by th e European Commission.
The pap er w ill di scus s th e main issues pertaining to th e EU ETS an d w ill analyze its
cru cial rol e with in th e d evel opm ent o f e nvirorun enral poli cy in Europe .
INTRODUCTION
This pap er proposition is to examine th e nature , th e stru ctu re, and th e d evelopment of
th e European Union Emission Trading Sche me (E U ETS). The EU ETS allo ws a certain
degree o f freed om for M ember States in ope rating th e trading system. under th e superv i-
sio n o f th e Eur opea n Com m issio n (EC) . The core o f th e syste m is a di stribution o f " righ ts
to em it carbo n d iox ide " , w h ic h are ca lled allowa nc es, to selected activ ities across Eu ropean
countri es.
The EU ETS is based on the rec ognitio n that , by creating a pri ce for carbo n through
th e establ ishme nt of a cap- and- t rade system and its rel ated m ark er , it w ill fo ster th e m ost
cos t-e ffective way for EU Member States to m eet th eir Kyo to o bligatio ns and co m mi r to
Eu ropean environm ental- energy policies w h ich 1I10 Ve towards a lo w-carbon and ene rgy ef-
ficient socie ty in the future. The EU ETS is a sim ple and cos t effec tive approac h to emissi o n
red uct io n and is fully integrated in the single market logic o f th e EU becau se it establishes
~l single market for carbon allowances. In what foll ows, I wi ll ex e m plify th e stru ctur e of the
syste m , describing the scheme development p ro cess and its framewo rk, and give proini-
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nence to its main featur es and I w ill also dr aw so m e co nclusio ns on its efficacy .
1. HISTORY
The environmental policy of the European Union is quite new when co m pared to
o ther policies. In fa ct, th e Treaties of Rome in 19 57 do not mention th e e nv iro nm en t at all.
Lat er decade s dr ew attentio n to a new imminenr p roblem: climate change . In late 1973 the
EU endo rsed its first en viro n m ental actio n, th e En vironmental Acti on Program , to offset
possible nati onal poli cies to become barri e rs o n building th e common market and to fost er
the envi ro n ment as th e basis of economi c and so c ial de velopment.' The fIrst com p re he nsive
and detail ed Treaty, w h ich addresses e nv iro nm ental poli cy, wa s th e Sing le European Act
in 19~6. The EU wa s give n responsibility ov er new areas such as th e en viro nm e nt , and it
made environmental pr otection a required co m po ne n t of all EU poli cies. The e nviromuent
sectio n of th e Treaty calls for the- Community to take actions relating to th e environment
to the extent to whi ch objectives like improving its quality, protecting human health, and
rati onal uti lizati on o f natural resources can be att aine d bette-r at C o m m un ity rather than
nati onal level. This is w itho ut Jeopardizing th e M ember States' co m pete nce to negotiate in
international bodi es and to co nclude international agree me nts . M oreo ver, in co nsidering
acti ons, "the environmental dmllllj!c should as II priority Vi' r{'(([ticd at source, and that the polluter
should pay". The co nce pt ofsustain.rb iliry w ill be included later in th e M aastri cht ( l992) and
Arnstcrdarn (1997) Treati es.
In this context and in urging acti o ns o n con trasting climate cha nge , th e Joint Energy
Environment C o uncil (1990) proposed to stabilize EU-15 carbon d ioxid e (C 0 2) emissions
at 1990 lev els by 2000 2 A first proposal abo u t a C 0 2 tax was dr aft ed in 1992; although it
was withdra wn five ye ars later. D espite thi s failure , the s.une yea r wa s th e inception of a
g lobal con u n in nen r o n climate cha nge: The United Nations Organi zati on under the Frame-
wo rk Conve ntio n o n C lim ate C hange (U N FCC C) in vol ved 160 parti es end o rsing to adopt
glo bal agreem ents o n climate issues. The C o nv entio n is com posed o f th e- Confere nce of
the Parties (CO P) w hich includes all th e co u ntries that are Parti es to th e Convent io n. The
third COP ad opted th e K yoto Protocol in th e year 1997, w hic h becam e th e m ost impo rtant
document ever dr afted on climate change . Its implications, both politi cal and technical, have
been tremendou s in th e past decade and ar e still the baseline for future negotiations.
The Kyot o Proto col includes m ore binding requirements fo r th e C o u n tries listed in
the Annex I (industria lized countri es) , w hich th e EU is part of. Art. 11 states that those
co u nt rie s must assist and provide fina ncial and technological resou rces to d ev eloping co un-
tries, in o rder to help them ad van ce with th e implementati on of exis ting co mm i tme nts.
The Proto col intends to promote suc h a harm onious development through three flexibl e
mechanism s.,\
Fir st, th e Protocol allows em issio n trading as a way of ge ne rating tradabl e carbon
cre dits: a C<lp and trad e syste m. Art. 17 defines th e em issio n trading and it is th e
syste m by w hich the d ev eloped co u nt ries acquire em issio n units from other de-
velo ped co un tries .
Second, th e J oint Impl em entati on 01) as defi ned in th e Art. 6 of the Pro to col al-
lows co u n tries under Kyoto co m m itm en ts to tak e part in th e e m issio ns redu cti on
pr oj ect in o the r countri es w h ich are under Kyot o con u n in u cn rs to o . A n Annex
I COllIlt ry is allo w ed to fina nce a proj ect in another Annex l coun try o btaining
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redu cti ons units d ispo sable to co mply w ith its Pr ot ocol requi rem ents.
Thi rd . th e C lean Developm ent Mec hanism (C D M ) gi ves a tool to help Annex I
part ies achi evin g co mpliance with th eir stricte r co nu ui u ne nrs and let developing
co u nt ries be assisted fro m project resulting in ce rtified em issio ns red uc tio n. An
Ann ex I country is allowed to fin ance a proj ect in a non Annex I country w hic h
ratified the Protocol , obtaining reducti o ns units d isposable to comply wit h its
Protocol requirem ents.
The Kyoto Protocol is th e m ilestouc of the develo pm ent of th e Eu rop ean U nio n
Emission Trade Sc he me. The Euro pea n Un io n has be en the g reatest supporter of the Pro-
tocol and II ,IS been developing ,I series ofag ree me nts and actions in o rde r to co mp ly with its
req uir em ents. These action s occ urred ill part befo re th e E U ratified th e Kyo to Pro toco l in
th e year 2002 . After th e adopti on o f th e third COP. the EU decide d to rea llocate th e em is-
sion red uctions quotas of each Mem ber State un der the Burde n Sharing agre em en t (BSA)
in the year 1998. The BSA was reaffirmed by joint ratifica tio n of the Kyo to Protocol in
2002 , wh ere it became a bind in g int ernational law. The BSA was made considering co st ef-
fici en cy and eq uity as baseline of its settlem ents. T his led to very different quotas ;1I1101I g the
EU member states: more st ringe nt target s were assign ed to Ge rm any and UK whi le som e
co untries were even allowed to inc rease th eir emissio ns."
Later in the year 2000 rhe EU bunch ed th e Europ ean C lima te C ha nge Prograuu nc
(EC CP), The go,d of th e EC CP is to ident ify and develop all necessary element s of an EU
stra tegy to Implement th e Kyoto Pro tocol. The developm en t of th e first EC CP in vo lved all
of the rele vant groups of stakeho lders working to gether, incl udi ng rep resen tat ives trout the
C ommissio n 's different departm ents (D C s), the M ember Sta tes , industry and environm ent al
group s. T he seco nd EC C P started III th e year 2005 and focused Oil several work ing groups,
one of w hich was ded icated to a rev iew of th e ETS.
The idea o f develop ing all emissio n tradin g syste m to co mply with th e Kyoto COIlI-
mirmeru s came w ith th e Crccu Paper "n C HC Emission Trading (2000). T he incep tion o f
th e E U ETS took place altho ugh the EU W,IS fo rm er ly strongly o pposed to emissio n trad-
ing d uri ng the int ernatio nal negoti at ion in Kyo to ." The EU ETS is a result of th e Kyo to
Protocol. However it is im plem ented throu gh Eur opean laws ind ep endently o f it . Its fun c-
tion is also to facilitat e o ther act io ns like self- conuniunents of the EU : th e 20-2 0-2U pact,
w hich sets targets on en ergy an d - 20 percent C02 emissio ns (1990 baselin e) within the
yea r 202 0 among th e Europea n Conu u unity, is based on EU ETS. The ETS has already
ex perim ented its first Phase and it is now run ning the second , th e one un der the Kyoto
co nuni n ne nrs. Its ro le as th e big gest wo rldw ide tool on C02 emiss ions reduct io n is go ing
to influence future ne gotiatio ns o n the post Kyot o actio ns w hich are set CO be acc o illplishe d
in the C openhagen COP later in 2U09.
2. DRIVERS
There are several feat ur es w hich characterize the EU ETS and make it a particular case
of emission tradi ng. T he current framew ork IS the outc om e of politi cal, iustirutional, and
private pre ssures and bargaining. It is di fficu lt to understand the exa ct dyn am ic dr iv ing each
fea tur e. but it is possib le to sho w wh ich are th e prin ciples that suppo rt th e EU ETS.
First of all th e EU ETS is an " add 0 11" syste m and is th erefor e co mpatible w ith w hat
m ost Europea n co untries used to comm it to th e Kyo to Pro to col. Each M ember State sha ll
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co n u n u nicate to the European Com m issio n (EC) th e amount of C 0 2 eq uiv ale n t e m issio ns
reduction co ining from internal polici es o ther than th e EU ETS . This is a favorabl e feature
to go ve rn me nts and their acti ons because they have control over th ei r industri es. Another
important feature is that an e m issio n trading is a system that does not undermin e the en-
vironrnenral objecti ve , since the overall amount of allowances is fixed (i.e. th e total EU
ETS C02 emissions cap is ultimatel y d ecided by th e EC ) . Rather, it e nab les cost-effective
implementation of the ov e rall target and provides in centives to inves t in en viroumentallv
so un d techn ol ogi es. This m akes a ETS J safe w,ly to com plv with th e Kyoto commitments.
The ke y econo mi c rati onale behind emissions tr ad in g is to use market m echanisrus to
e nsu re that e m issio ns redu cti ons required to achieve a pre-determined environmental out-
co me take place w here th e co st of redu cti on is th e lo w est . Furthe rmo re , emissions trading
induces competition between companies to fmd cost-effective wa ys to redu ce th eir emis-
sio ns , and add it io nal boost is given to c uv iro nm c n tally friendly techn ologies." The intention
is to ensure that the EU ETS results in reductions in e missio ns which are additi onal to those
that are alread y provid ed fo r by Conununi ry legislati on on ren ewable enerb'Y in e lec tricity
production. "
Althou gh there are n o major applications of tr adable allowan ces under EU environ-
m ental poli cy, th e con cept o f tradable allo w ances is not totally unfamiliar in th e European
Com m u nity . The quotas for Ozone D epleting Substances unde r th e Montreal Protocol is
o ne example and the form er successfu l ex pe rie nce de rivi ng from th e US with su lp hu r di o x-
id e emissions trading is an other one."
The EU ETS is implemented at th e European level: it is a common system to the 27
EU Member States . A political driver to the realization of a co mm o n EU m embers ETS
is the group o f European In stitutions. In fact the EU is not onl y a g ro up of co un tries par-
ticipating in a set framew ork, it is also a sup ranatio na l institut ion w ith its own offices and
jurisdiction over some issu es. Consequently one point of view ab o u t the EU ETS boo st
com es from th e proper EU instituti o ns. Sin ce the T reaties of R ome there has been a calling
for a common mark et as a ba silar ste p towards integration . It 's not su rp ris ing that the EU
institutions are encouraging a resolutio n at an EU level of the Kyoto commitment.
The EU has a particular character, st ill not full y .rccouutable to citizens and so to th ei r
o p in io n or co nse nsus, but st ro n gly st ructu red and m ade out of technical groups. This helped
th e EU ETS to be fostered , since it met man y effi cien cy requirements, compatible with th e
idea of a cou u non m arket and in cr easin g integrat ion . The Green Paper on G H G Emission
Trading hi ghlights th ese facts mentioning man)' features that a ETS at th e Eu ropean level
might b e th e best way to co m ply with the Kyoto Protocol. "The Commission believes that a
coherent .uu! co-ordinated fram el/!ork./in implementin;; emissions tradil~R w !Jering all Member Stales
would /Jrol'irfc tlic best ,Ruamlllee./ilY a Sll/oothJiil/Cfiol/il/g internal emissions marlect as compared 10 a
set of unco-ordinated national emissions tmdiflcR schemes, "" Moreo ver, com pa n ies which operate
in a free European market, would have had Ulan)' co ns train ts if th e ETS ha d been developed
sep arate ly in individual countries ruther than at th e European level.
The free market ha s made busin ess eas ily implemented at European lev el so that m an y
com pan ies operate no w ad ays in different EU M ember States; when companies were o pe ra t-
ing within national borde rs some decad es ago. Therefore it 's lik el y that compan ies preferred
a EU-wide ETS to 27 individual ETS. A Conununiry emissions trading sch eme leads to o ne
single pri ce for allowanc es traded by com pan ies wi th in the sch eme, while different un con-
nected nati onal sc he mes w ould result in different prices within each national sc heme and
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consequently to ~~ distortion of th e Eu rop ean market.
Activiti es w hich account for th e major share of th e EU ETS are those relat ed to en-
ergy , and th er efore power plants are pla ying a central ro le. The electricity secto r h~IS been
histori cally nationalized. but In th e past 20 years there has been a progressive Iiber alization of
the secto r. Th is is th e co nseq ue nce o f bo th a politi cal pressure at the Europ ean leve l In order
to co m ply with a co nuno n free mark er and a technical cho ice to foster e ne rgy effic ie nc y. Jn
(ICt, nat ionaliz ati on has helped to build a so lid po wer plant and electri cal system framework
but has not been able to maximi ze efficiency as th e lib eralization of th e market is likel y to
do. Consequentl y. the energy sector has been developing knowledge and att itude to work
in a mark et regime. The EU ETS co m es as the main sec to r involved in it and has already
developed to o ls to tackl e a m arket regime. This is likely to be a prevailing reason why the
E U ETS Iu s been e ndo rsed .
Gua rantees o f co m petitiveness, pooling co uuu itrn e nt, and a pilot ph ase have been
add ressed in th e EU ETS to respo nd to crit ical bu siness issues. This is link ed to a national
role of allo cati on management , ( Ivo rable to both ind ivid ual gov ern m ents fo r the cr iti cal
importan ce o n being responsible for the allocation p rocess, and business whi ch has more
possibility to co nd itio n a nati onal le vel allowances di stribution.
Fin ally The inclusion of] 1 and above all of CDM cr ed its in the EU ETS w ere fostered
by acti viti es in vol ved in th e ETS since they represent an oppo rtuni ty to ob tain cheaper
cred its from proj ects. The European C ommissio n must ve rify these credits in o rde r to add-
OIl to national cred its. Businesses' soc ial resp onsibili ty and env iro nme ntal performance play
a strategic ro le in the de velopment o f flexible m ech ani sms. The Linking D irec tive states:
"SiIIC(, participation inJ1 and CDN1project activities is voluntary, corporate enviro n-
mental and social respollsibility ami accoulltabilit )' sllOuld be cnliantcd ill accordance
with pam;zraph / 7 of the Pian ~(il1lp lell1 e l1 la t io l1 ~l l h(' worldSU111111it 011 sustainable
developm ent . "
3. THE LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK9. 10
The Emissio ns Trading D irective is the c harte r th at pro vides th e legal foundation for
the EU ETS. The European Com m issio n first publi shed a draft proposal in Octo ber 2001,
which was fo rm ally enacted in O cto ber 2003: th e C rCCtI Paper 011 CHC Eniission TrarlinJ: .
Sin ce it was drafted there has been mu ch discussion o ve r the development o f the EU ETS.
The two years th at separate th e fIrS t pr op osal from th e definiti ve endo rsem ent we re charac-
teri zed by cha nge o vers between th e European Parliament and Council. Am endments in th e
two years be twee n the fonnal draft proposal and its fin al enac tme nt were added as rep orted
in th e do cume nts availabl e at til e EC en viro n m ent D G . The release o f th e propos ed E U
Directive o n GHC emissi ons trading in October 2001 initiated th e co -decisio n process,
wher eby th e European Parli am ent and the Europ ean Council w ould share together th e
inst itu tio nal power the y hold . The first reading of th e proposal took pla ce in the European
Parliament in October 2002 and it led to <I n ame nde d pro posal from th e C o m m issio n in
N o vember 2002 . /n March 2003, th e Counc il o f th e European U nio n ado pted a couuuon
positi on 0 11 th e directi ve . The C o m m issio n supp o rted the C ommon Position ad opted o n
March 18, 2003. Tile sub sequ ent ag ree m en t bet ween th e Parliament and th e Counc il led to
final adoption of the proposal by the Council o n ] LIl y 22, 2003 and promulgation as Direc-
tive 2003 / 87 / EC on October 13, 2003.
As th e K yoto Protoco l pro vides, the flexibl e m ech anisms play an important roleon th e
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acce ptan ce of the E U ETS. T he Commissio n responded to this need hy the ado ption o f a
specific p rovision link ing J o int Im plementatio n an d C lean D evelo pment M ech an ism credi ts
to the E U ET S. It issued th e pro posal as th e " Lin king D irective" (Eu ro pean C om m ission
2003) on J uly 23 , 20 03 . The Linki ng Direct ive we nt in ro fo rce as Direct ive 2004 / 101/ EC
o n November 13 , 2004 . Member States had to hri ng into force the laws, reg ulations, and
admi nistrat ive provisions necessary to co mply wi th th e Linking Di rec tive by November 13,
2005.
4. How IT WORKS 11
The E U ETS IS a cap an d trad e' system. T he overall cap on em issio ns is fixe d and
div ided am on g its participants. The system pro vides the possibiliry for the existen ce of mar-
ke t plat forms in orde r to facilitate trade among part icip ant s. E very parti cipant has to com ply
w ith its emissions cap (i.e. the requireme nt on its total C02 em issions) , w hich is represented
by assign ed allowances on emiss io ns. O ne allo wance gives the hold er the right to emit one
to nne of C02. These allo wances arc the comm on trading 'c urrency' at the heart of th e
system : part icipa nts are allow ed to trade off th ei r allowances as lon g as they respect their
cap . Allowances are central to the EU ETS as they are th e measure of the em issio ns, and its
number is o ne of the key det e rin inants of th e pri ce in the market.
The system was o riginally di vided into two phases. T he first on e, kn own as pi lot ph ase ,
took place betwee n 2005-2007 . T he seco nd is now In place and follows the Ky oto 2008-
20 12 time period. C urre nt ly, every M em ber State shall presen t to the Eur op ean C om-
mission , fo r eac h trading period unde r th e sche me , a nati ona l alloca tion plan (NAP). T his
do cume nt de te rmines to tal lev els of ETS em issio ns and how man y em issio n allowances
e.nh installation wi th in the country receives eac h year. At the end of each year installations
mu st sur render allowances equi valent to their em issio ns. Companies that keep th eir em is-
sions belo w th e level of th eir allowances are in a lon g position and can se ll th e surp lus of
allowances. Those which are emitting more th an allowed are in a short pos ition and can bu y
allowance s o n th e market. The cho ice of recu rri ng to th e market rather than to investing
ill self- co mpliance are l ikely to he derermi ned by relat ive cos ts. In fact, th e ultimate goal of
th e E U ETS is to reach reduc tion s in the most cost effective way. Commi ssio n studies have
concluded t hat th e targets can be achieved at an an nual cos t of€2.9 to €3 .7 billion , which is
less than 0 .1 % of GDP of th e EU . O ne of th ese studies co ncluded that withou t th e Emis-
sio ns T rading Scheme cos ts co uld rearh €(d l hi llio n . Emission tradi ng thus allows the cos ts
of Kyoto to he redu ced .
5. PARTICIPANTS AND CAPS
T od ay the E U ETS Includ es the parti cipati on of all th e E U- 27 M ember States (Ro-
mania and Bulgari a joined in 2007) ,IS wel l as Ice lan d , Liechtenstein , and N orway (2008)
w hich are not E U m embers . T he D irective 20OJ/l'l 7/ EC enac ted the E U ETS, specifying
tile sector s invol ved in the cap and trad e system . An nex I of th e direc tive exem plifies th e
acti vities involved w hic h are reported in the T able 1.1 . Some m or e activities, w h ich are not
included in Ta ble 1.1, were adde d with the hegi nning o f seco nd phase .
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Table 1.1 Categories of Activ ities under the EU ETS
Act ivities Gr eenh o use Gases
EII(,(~)' aaivi iic,
C omb ustio n installations with J rated therma l input ex ceeding 20 M W Carb on dioxide
(exce pt haz.rrdo us or municipal waste insrallarious)
M ine ral oil refine ries C arbon diox ide
C o ke ovens Carbon diox ide
Production clll d pl'Or('ssill,Q o(li'rm ll ,' III e/cll_'
Metal ore (inc luding sulphide are) roasting or sinrering installutious Ca rbo n dioxi de
Installations for the product ion o f pig iro n or steel (primary or secondary Ca rbon diox ide
fusion ) incl ud ing continu ous casting, wi th a capacity exc eeding 2.5 ron nes
per hour
Mincra! il/llu.'/I')'
Installations for the production ofce mc nr clinker in rot ary kilns wit h a pro - Carbon diox ide
ducr ion capacity exceed ing 500 ro nnes per day or lillie in rot ary kilns with a
product ion capacity exceeding 50 ronnes per day or in other IiIm aces wi th a
production capac ity exceeding 50 ro nues per day
Installations for the manufactu re o f glass including glass fibre with a llleiting Carb on dioxide
capaci ty exceeding 20 ronues per day
Installation s for the manut actu re of ceramic produ cts by firing. in particular Ca rbon diox ide
roo fing tiles. bricks. refracto ry bricks, tiles. stonew are o r porcelain. wi th a
producti on capacity exceed ing 75 ron nes per day, and / or wi th ;l kiln capac-
ity excee ding -l Ill; and with a sett ing den sity per kiln exceedi ng JOO kg/ Ill'
Cnhcr artirisic,
Indu str ial plan ts for the producti on of Carbon dioxide
(a) pu lp from timb er or other fibro us materials
(b) paper and hoard with a prod uct io n capacity exceedi ng 20 tou nes per day Carb on dioxide
Source: Directive 2003/ 87/Ee
T able 1.1 clea rly shows ho w th e E U ETS targ et s thos e activities w hi ch result in mas-
sive e m issions. This is the fundam ental c ri te ria o n whet her to assign com pliance reglllre-
m e nts to co m pa nies or no t. T he point regardi ng e ne rgy ac t iv it ies incl ud es el ectric ity an d
heating produ cti o n . These are th e bulk of the E U ETS since t he y are carbo n inten sive
em itte rs and installatio ns b igger than 20 M W cover a very lar ge share ofE uropean elect rici ty
an d he:lting produ ct io n . O t he r activities In T able 1.1 , suc h as pro du ct io n o f m et als, are ve ry
intensive emitters for the pa rt icu lar manu fact urin g process, Other ind ustri es, suc h as cement
facto ries, result in large e m issio ns for thei r chem ica ls. The participat ion is ultimately defined
at E u ro pea n le vel b y the EC Di recti ve 2003/ R7 , b ut so m e e xcepti o ns ar e allow ed : in par-
ticular cases, so me activ ities unde r th e EU ETS co u ld not be constrai ned to any req u ire me n t
even th ough th ey are part o f t he activ it ies listed in T ab le 1.1,
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Transportation as we ll as residen tial-h ou seh old . resulting in diluted emissio ns, is co m-
pletely neglected despite th e fact th at em issio ns con ring fro m tra nspo rtation are not negligi -
ble at all. In the EU , tra nspo rt is respon sible for 2] percent of EU greenhou se gas emi ssion s,
hou seh olds and sm all businesses for 17 percent and agri culture for 10 percent.
The other fund .un enr al poin t is th e cap . The ove rall E U cap abo ut G H Gs emission
reducti on s is equal to the EU co nuu irmeut under the Kyot o Proto col. T Ilt' E U ETS cap is
a " cap w ithi n th e cap" , assigned to the trading secto r co nsidering the 200~- 201 2 phase."
In fact th e Kyoto co m mi tme nts are not tiJlJy under the EU ETS but also unde r th e non-
tradin g secto rs which eve ry member state must ex empli fy in its nat ion al repor ts (Na tion al
Allocation Plans).
An other important issue is how man y allowances are distributed amo ng the activiti es:
the crite ria her e is based o n the abateme nt possibiliti es o f eac h activity inclu ded . The o ut -
co me is that th e energy secto r accounts for th e main share of emissio ns reduc tio ns. Under
th e EU ET S, abou t 11,500 energy- int en sive plants across th e EU-27 are to day able to buy
and sell permits to emi t carbo n dioxid e, representing aro und 45 per cent of the EU 's to tal
C02 em issions (or abo ut 30 per cent of its overall G H G em issio ns)Y
This point, the distributio n alllo ng activi ties, reveals a parti cu lari ty of the EU ETS.
The o vera ll cap is defin ed b y th e Commissio n w hich detain s ultimately the power to accept
th e distr ibution of allowa nces. H o wever, th e distribution is left to th e Member States : each
one has the responsibility to allo cate allowances am ong national activities. This du alism is
a parti cular feature of th e EU ETS when co m pared to othe r emissi on trading system s. The
Comm issio n 's decision s on th e nation al allo cat ion plans for the Phase II amounted to 2083
m illion to nnes per year follo win g the decision of th e Court on th e Slova k plan, which de-
finitively set th e Slova kia Phase II cap . T abl e 1.2 sho ws the total amo unt o f alloc at ion in th e
N ational Allocation Plans (N A Ps). Each Member States was assigned a specific emissions
cap bo th III Phas e I and " . Ali of th e Phase " caps result ed stricter th an th ose of Pha se I, and
almost all of th e cap that Member States proposed for Phase II were m odified by th e C orn -
mission towards bigger stringency (except Denm ark , France , Slov eni a, and UK's pr op osed
cap) . Different amounts o f JI/CD M cre d its use were allowed throu gh out EU Member
Sta tes, as the y were im plemented wi thin the EU ETS start ing from Phase II. In fact, afte r
th at th e EU ETS was en dorsed by th e Directive 2003l87 / EC ; it was subsequent ly am ende d
by th e Directive 200411OllEC (kn own as the Link ing Directive) which adopted legislation
regu lat ing th e admission of COM credi ts.
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Table 1.2 Data of National Allocating Plans (emissions in Mt)
Emissions
Cap allowed f rom addt'l
1st period Propo sed 2008· 2012 (in installati ons JI/ CDM
cap (2005- 2005 ver ified cap 2008- rela tion to pro - in 2008- limi t 2008-
Memb er State 2007 ) emissions 2012 posed) 2012' 2012 in %'
Aust ria 33.0 33.4 32 .8 30.7 (906%) 0.35 10
Belgium 62.1 55.58 3 63.3 58.5 (92.4%) 5.0 8.4
Bulgaria 42 .3 40 .6' 67 .6 42.3 (62.6%) n.a 12.55
Cyprus 5.7 5.1 7.12 5.48 (77%) n.a 10
Czech Rep. 97.6 82.5 101.9 86.8 (85.2%) n.a 10
Denmark 33.5 26.5 24 .5 24.5 (100%) 0 17.01
Estonia 19 12.62 24.38 12.72 (52.2%) 0.3 1 0
Finland 45.5 33.1 39.6 37.6 (94.8%) 0.4 10
France 156.5 131.3 132.8 132.8 (100%) 5.1 13.5
Germany 499 474 482 453 .1 (94%) 11.0 205
Greece 74.4 71.3 75.5 69.1 (91.5%) n.a 9
Hungary 31.3 26.0 30.7 269 (87.6%) 1.43 10
Irela nd 22.3 22.4 22.6 22.3 (98.6%) n.a 10
Italy 223.1 225.5 209 195.8 (93.7%) n.k." 14.99
Latvia 4.6 2.9 7.7 3.43 (44.5%) n.a 10
Lith uania 12.3 6.6 16.6 8.8 (53%) 0.05 20
Luxembourg 3.4 2.6 3.95 2.5 (63%) n.a 10
Ma lta 2.9 1.98 2.96 2.1 (71%) n.a Tbd
Netherlands 95.3 80.35 90.4 85.8 (94.9%) 4.0 10
Poland 239.1 203. 1 284.6 208.5 (73.3%) 6.3 10
Portugal 38.9 36.4 35.9 34.8 (96.9%) 0.77 10
Romani a 74.8 70.8 ' 95.7 75.9 (79.3%) n.a 10
Slovakia 30.5 25.2 41 .3 32.6 (78.9 %) 1.78 7
Slovenia 8.8 8.7 8.3 8.3 (100%) n.a 15.76
Spain 174.4 182.9 152 .7 152.3 (99.7%) 9.56.78 ca. 20
Swede n 22.9 19.3 25.2 22.8 (90.5%) 2.0 10
UK 245.3 242.4 ' 246.2 246.2 (100%) 9.5 8
5UM 2298 .5 2122 .16 10 2325 .34 2082.68 (89.56%) 54.69 -
Source: European Commission
1. The figu res indica ted in this col um n comprise em issio ns in installat io ns th at come un -
der th e cove rage of the sche me ill 2008 to 2012 du e to all ext ended scope appli ed by
the member state dud do not include new installatio ns e nte ring the sche me in secto rs
alread y covered ill th e first trad ing period .
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2. The jllCDM limit IS ex pressed as ,I per centage of the member state's cap and indi cates
th e ni axiuuun extent to w hich companies may surrender j oint Implementation 01)
o r C lea n D evelopment M echanism (C O M ) credits instead of E U ETS allowan ces to
cov e r th eir e m issio ns. These jI and C O M cr ed its are ge nerated by emission-saving
proj ect s carried o ut ill thi rd co unt ries under th e Kyoto Proto col' s proj ect-based flex-
ib le m ech an isms.
3. Inclu d ing installations that Belgium o pted to exclude tempo rarily from th e scheme in
2005.
4. Due to Bulgaria's recent acc essio n to th e E U , this figure is not independently ver ified .
5. The Germ an nati on al allocatio n law co nt ains a figure o f 22%, w hich relates to th e al-
lo wan ces alloc ated free o f charge, rather th an th e tota l cap.
6. Italy has to include furth er install ati ons. The amount of add itio nal emissions is no t
kn o wn at thi s stage .
7. Due to Romania's recent accession to th e EU, this figure is not independentl y veri fied ,
8. Add iti onal installations and emissions of ov e r six million tonues are alread y in clu ded as
of 2006 .
9 . Ve rified em issio ns for 2005 do not in clu de installati on s which th e U.K. o pted to ex-
clu de temporaril y from th e scheme in 20 05 but which will be covered in 2008 to 20 12
and are estim ated to ,1I 110un t to some 30 milli on ronnes.
10 . The sum of verified emissio ns for 2005 do es not include insr.rllarions w hich th e U .K.
o pted to exclude temporarily from th e schem e in 2005 but which will be covered in
2008 to 20 12 and are estim ated to am ount to some 30 milli on tonnes. Furthermore, the
emissio ns figure s fo r Bulgaria and R om ani a are not ind ep endently verified .
6. TIME PERIODS STRUCTURE
The E U ETS wa s first cre ated to help EU Member States to co nunit to th e Kyoto
Protocol. It IS therefore reaso nable that a EU ETS Pha se co inc ide s with Kyoto Prot oc ol
co mmittin g period . The ex istence of a pilot Phase to prep are the EU M ember States to
the m ain Pha se was inclu ded in the Dircct ive 2003/ 87 / EC . Fo r each phase M ember States
had to dr aft a NAP: th e exis te nce of NAP I and NAP II respective ly refer to P hase I (the
Pilot Ph ase) which ran bet ween 2005 and 2007 , and Pha se II be tween 2008 and 20 12. The
struct u re of the Ph ases in terms of o bliga tio ns and prescription of regulations is th e same,
except fo r so m e deta ils (e.g. penalti es: 40 Eu ro for each not returned allo wan ce under the
first ph ase, 100 Euro under the second). M ore activities w er e co m pelled to co m ply with the
EU ETS: among th ese are Glass, Mineral W ool, Gypsum, Petrochemicals (cracke rs), Car-
bon Black , Integrat ed Stee lwo rks, Flaring from offsho re o il and gas produ ction . M oreover,
th e Linking Directi ve added a ne w cr ite rio n . This requi res each plan to state ho w many
cred its fro m JJ and C O M proj ects, th ose plants cove red by th e allocation plan , are permitted
to sur re nder for co m plian ce in the seco nd trading period .
C 0 2 emissions o f th e activities und er the EU ETS ha ve risen by 1.9 percent w ithin
th e Ph ase 1, well belo w th e EU GOP growth. l~ For th e seco nd trading peri od th e Cornmis-
sio n has ca pped nat ion al emissio ns from EU ETS sect o rs at an average of aro u nd 6.5 percent
below 2005 levels to help ensure th at the EU as a whole, and Member States individually,
del iver o n th eir Kyot o conu n itm e nrs. T o do th at o pe rato rs are glo bally allowed to import
up to 1,'0132 milli on cred its durin g Pha se [I. ln a pr elim ina ry but det ailed an alysis o f thi s dat a,
Ellerman and Bu chner (20 08) concluded that a reasonab le estimate of th e red uctio n in C02
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emissions attri butable to the EU ETS lies between 50 and 100 milli on tons for eac h ye ar , o r
between 2.5 per cent and 5 per cent from what emissions would hav e be en without th e EU
ETS . This is an important reductio n , co nsid e ring that en viron mental policies have nev er
produced suc h a reduction befo re .
More di scu ssion is tak in g place ab out th e next Phase. In fact th e EU ETS is going to
be th e to ol to cor n u u t wi th th e Euro pean de veloped 20-20-20 pact. The revi sion o f th e
EU ETS w as negotiated by th e U nion 's head s of state and gov ernme nt in Brussels o n D e-
cember 11, 2008, and the European Parliament app roved the new regime at first reading o n
December 17. The main elements o f the new system, which will ent e r into force in 20 n
and run until 2020 are Illan y: ca pping total EU ind us tr ia l emissions at 21 percent belo w
2005 le vels by 2020 (i.e . a m aximum o f 1720 mill ion allowances) , the EU-wide target re-
pla ces th e curre n t 27 national rurgers. en larg ing th e sco pe o f th e sche m e to ne w secto rs so
that around 50 percent o f all EU emissi o ns wou ld be covered, auc tio n ing as early as 20 13,
around 60 per cent of the total number of allo w an ces.
7. NATIONAL ALLOCATION PLANs 1; , I f,
The National All ocatio n Plans ar e th e core e le m e nt s of th e EU ETS. Each M ember
State must d raft its o w n N AP as required by th e EC . After taking in to co ns ide ration th e
assigned cap and th e ac tiv it ies esta blishe d b y th e D irec t ive 2003/R7 / EC, national govern-
ments must d istribute th e allo w ances o n emissions. This mea ns th at for each tradin g peri od
each M ember State must d ecid e ill advance h o w m any allowances to allo cate in total and
how m an y allo w ances eac h plant covered by th e sc hem e will recei ve individually. This
process highlights the d ecentrali zed nature o f th e EU ETS whi ch co nsists of the w ork o f
nati onal apparatus and inst itutions under th e regulat io n and ultimat e d eci sion of th e E C .
Each nation has developed regi stries and has g ive n authority to its state apparatu s in
order to achieve ,1 complet e framewo rk w hic h wo uld follow th e regulati ons created by
the NAP . Actually, Membe r Sta res are periodically required to d raw up the ir NAP well in
advance of eac h ETS trading peri od and to have it app ro ved by th e European Commission .
Each M ember State had to prepare and pu bli sh a first NAP fo r the 2005-2007 tr ad -
in g peri o d by M arch 31, 2004 (M ay 1, 2004 fo r the 10 new M ember States). NAPs for
th e second ETS trading peri od had to be submitted to th e Comm issio n lry June 30, :200().
D eadlin es need to be respect ed so th at th e Com m issio n makes decisions o n all th e N APs and
Mem ber Sta tes can tak e th e ir final allocation dec isions well befo re th e trading per iod start s.
Consequ ently, the Commission must make a decis io n on each NAP w ithi n three m onths o f
th e NAP having been notified to it.
M em ber States have t wo o ptio ns on how to di stribute allowan ces: free of cha rge or by
auc t io ning. Article 10 o f th e D irec t ive 2003/ R7/EC sti pula tes that fo r the fir st an d seco nd
trading period Member Sta tes must allocat e at least 95 percent respecti vel y 90 perce nt o f th e
allo w ances fre e of ch arge . D ur ing th e fir st tra d in g period , M ember States auctioned o nly
very limited quantities of allowances. For th e seco nd trading period , st ill the lion 's share o f
allowan ces has been allocat ed for free, alth ou gh som ew h at m ore significan t quantities have
been au ctio ned . The n ext phase, starting in 2013, is going to mark a turning point since
th e Com m issio n states th at auctio ni ng of allo w an ces is going to be th e rule rath er th an the
exception .
The process o f endorse ment of th e NAPs exe m p lifies th e ultimate decisional po w er o f
th e C om mis sio n . If th e Com miss io n does not reject any aspect o f <l NAP, th e M ember State
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can mak e a final decision o n th e allocation to ind ividual install ation s. If th e Commission
finds th at a NAP is not in lin e with the agreed cr ite ria or with th e EU Treaty it can reject
it parti ally or in fuU. A rej ection of a national allocatio n plan m eans th at the Member State
ma y not proceed in implementing th e plan as it stands (i.e . ma y no t alloc ate the number
of proposed allowanc es) . The C om m issio n must give its reaso ns for rejecting a NAP, and
th ese re ~I S0 1lS give guida nce on ho w Member States can mak e the plan co m patible wi th th e
allocation cr ite ria.
If M ember States wh ose plans have been partially rejected impl em ent the pr op osed
changes th ey do not hav e to subm it their plans to the Commission a secon d time but can
pro ceed in taking their final alloca tio n de cisio n. After receiving th e C omm ission 's approva l
a Member State has to pr oceed to ma ke a final alloca tio n decision at th e nati ona l level.
Be fore do ing so, it can make changes to th e number of allowan ces for indi vidual plants as
a result of impro ved data , (e .g, if histori c emissio ns data are used for a plant-l evel allocatio n
formul a. o r to increase th e percentage of allo w an ces that it will auctio n) .
O nc e th e final allo cation decision has been made at th e national level and the final
plan is pu blished, no m ore changes (known as " ex-post adju snuenr s") to the number of
allowa nces in total o r per pla nt can be m ad e in the national alloca tio n plan. In fact , th e
C ommission is bound to ac t in accordance with its o bligatio ns un der the Treaty in view
of safegua rd ing fair co m petition and freed om o f cstablishme ur w ith in the int ernal mark et
and ex- po st adj ustme nt s are iucoinpatible w it h th e legal fram ework becau se the y represent
interventions that disrupt th e market and cr eate uncertainty fo r co m panies. For ex am ple , if
a compan y faces the p ossibility that the gov e rnment may tak e away allowances after it has
redu ced its em issio ns, It w ill hesitate to do so .
7.1 DISTRIBUTION OF ALLOWANCES
Art icle 11 (4) of th e Di rec tive 2003 /8 7 / EC does not specify th e proportion o f allo w-
ances w hic h Member States are to issue each year. In tlCt, M ember States sho uld have th e
flexibility to issue highe r p roportion of allo wances In the fir st yea rs of the period if th ey so
wi sh . Annual issuin g. in co nj unct ion with an n ual surrendering. sh ou ld ensure th at ope rato rs
kee p a goo d understanding o f th eir em issio ns trajectory. This would avoid th e occ urrence
of pri ce spikes at th e end o f the 3 o r 5 years peri od . The qu antit y of allowances a M ember
State ma y issue is go verned by th e 11 C rite ria specified in th e Annex III o f th e Directi ve
2003lH7 l Ee. Among th ese are: me eting th e EU's and M ember States' Kyo to co run u t-
m ents, ~lC tu a ] verified emissions reported in th e Commission 's an nua l progress repo rts, and
th e technological potenti al for reducing emissio ns. The Emissions Trading Directi ve does
not ex plicitly pre scribe a give n number of allowances. but eac h M ember State 11l1lSt respect
the crite ria. The wa y by w hich allowances are allocated is a kind of reiterati on between
governm ent and ind ustries conside ring th e data provided by th e latt er.
All ame -ndment to th e ETS Directi ve (i.e . the Linking Di recti ve), allows com pa nies in
th e second trading period to usc credits from JI and th e C D M , up to a certain pro port ion o f
th eir alloc ation of emission allow ances in o rde r to cover th ei r em issions. T he degr ee of use
must be sup plem ental to re ductions achi ev ed through domestic policy action . It also needs
to be fix ed by each M ember State in its NAP by specifymg th e maximum am ount o f such
cre d its. M ember States are free to choose whe the r to app ly the limit individually in respect
to each insrallati on , or co llec tively to all installations. For g rea te r flexi bility, th e C om mis-
sio n is recom mending th at M ember States appl y the limit for th e ent ire tradi ng period and
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co llec tively to all insta llatio ns.
It is interesting to note th at , alt ho ugh th e easte rn European M ember Star es are in -
clude d in th e A nn ex J co un tries of the C o nve nt ion (UN FC CC) , th ey don' t need parti cul ar
m easures in o rder to co m m it to any Kyoto rcqu ircmcurs. In t;lCl, th eir actual emiss io ns arc
much lo wer th an in I ')l) (), since em issio ns decreased in th e first half of th e 1990s d ue to th e
economic n-structur ing in Eastern Euro pe. T he pos sib ility o f distort ion s ill th e EU ET S
m ark et when easte rn M ember States were allow ed to d istribute free amou nts ofallo wan ces.
is a major issue . In o rde r to avoid th is, the EC set ,I cap in their NAPs co nsid ering the bus i-
ness as usual ex pec tation on th ose co u ntries.
The ou tcome of allo wa nces distrib u tio n in th e firs t ph ase, as show n in th e Figure 1.1 ,
is th at th e elec tric ity utility sector assumed a net sho rt positio n w hen the o ther industria l
activities w ere ne t long . In additi on , Figure 1. 1 highli ghts ho w the m ark et vo lume was
co nce nt rated w ithi n th e energy secto r. T he allo w an ces di stributi on crea te d both a long and
sho rt gross position ac ro ss the various Euro pean inst allati ons, whose final tr ade off o utcome
w as a enert-'J' sector net shor t positi on . All of th e other industri al activi ties u nd er the EU
ETS resulted in a net long positio n .
Figure 1.1 Sectors allowances position
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Source: OTL, 2007
7.2 ALLOWANCES TRADE OFF
Each M ember Stare mu st arrang e ad m inist rative ar rangement and issue authori ryfies)
to co m ply wi th th e D irective 2lJ03 /H7 /EC . Amo ng th ese. arrangem ents o n th e issue of
regis ters sets an acc ura te accou nt ing o f th e holding, transfe r and cancellati on of allo w an ces,
T h is regis try system is separate from trad ing activity since not all trades res ult in changes ill
o w ner ship of allowan ces. However , w here a trade culm inates in a cha nge in own ership ,
a transfe r o f allowan ces bet ween acc ou nts in the registry systelll is ma de . Both th e gov-
c rrune nr. hy th e appoi n ted authori ty . and each pe rson w ho det ain s allowa nces shall kee p
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track of holding, tran sfer, and cancellatio n in co mpliance with the Directive 2003187l Ee.
Alth ou gh an y third party can bu y and sell allowances, they first need to ope n an account
anywhere in an EC registry. B y creating an elec t ronic database , the C ommission ensures
that th ere arc no transfers incompatible with o bligatio ns resulting from th e Kyoto Protocol.
To do thi s the Commission designated a Ce nt ral Administrator to maintain an ind ep endent
transaction log recording the issue, transfer, and can cellation of allowances and checking the
registers of each Member State." The outcom e is a connection of all the nation al registers
under th e Comm unity Independent Transaction Log (CITL) which provides alloca tio n and
emissions dat a at th e installation level. Moreover , a recent achievement sees the co nnec tion
of the CITL and M ember State registries with the UNFCCC luternational Transaction Log
(ITL), been co mpleted on October 16, 2008.17
The Directi ve 2003l87/ EC does not mention the establishment o f any marketplaces.
The leg,11 fram ework of the trading sche me does not regulate how and where th e market in
allowances take s place . C ompanies with commitments may trade allowan ces directly with
each othe r, or they lllay huy or sell via a broker , bank or other market int erm edi ary , The
exist en ce of stock markets is therefore th e outco me of the willingness of som e participants
of the EU ETS. For example, in the wake of ele ctricity markets, energy mark et manag-
ers launched, ill 2005, six marketplaces, co ntributing to the transparency and liquidity of
the market. In 2007, organized marketplaces facilitated more than 70 percent of allowanc e
transactions, a steady growth from approximatel y 40 percent in 2005.R
There are seve ral kinds of contracts used to trade off allowances: the Over The Coun-
ter (OTC) ones accounted for all average of 57 percent in Ph ase I. The EU ETS grew over
the course of 2007, with a traded volume of 1.6 G r and a value of €28 billion . This repre-
sents a volume growth o f 62 percent and ;1 value growth of 55 percent from 2006. The EU
ETS was still by far the largest carbon market worldwid e in 2007 , with 62 percent of the
ph ysical mark et and 70 percent of the financi al m ark et .IS
8. EU ETS NEW ENTRANTS - CLOSURES l 9
The provision s about new entrants and possible closures are another distin gui shin g
mark of the EU ETS comparing to other trading schemes. Their accomplishment is th e
offshoot of politi cal pr essure of the governments towards the EC to safeguard industry in -
vestments and m aintaining plants within the nation . The outcome is usually a free allowance
distribution to new entrants and withdrawal of allowances from any facility that shuts do wn .
The first ph ase saw a reservation on allowance to new entrants of 195 tons on emis-
sions, that is equ al to abo ut 3 percent of the total. The distribution of these has been regulat-
ed mostly on a " first co me first se rved basis" principl e. In the case rhat more allowances are
needed to sat isfy a massive presence of new entrants, every govem ment has a ce rta in degree
offreedom . Some gov ernments, such as Italy and C erma ny, stated to buy on the market the
needed allowance for the new entrants, Also , in th e case that the reserve is not fully used,
governments are allowed to choose whether to annul the remaining or not. The qu antity of
allowance is susceptible to government decisi on s roo: in fact the best practi ce is to consider
the best technology in use in order to assess th e new entrants allowances endowment.
At the same time closure provisions permit the EU Member States some degree of
freedom. Closures that oc cur during a phase allow th e activity owner to retain th e allowance
until the end of the ph ase when the government authorize s it . Also, as in the case of Ger-
many, there co uld be a transfer of allowances between closing activities and new entrants to
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foster th e establ ishment of ind ustries wi thin th e co unt ry.
9. MONITORING, REPORTING, VERIFYING" U
Every work ing syste m need s to be reviewed to e nsur e its o peratio n and p ro vid e cred-
ibili ty . M onito ring. repo rtin g. and ve rifying arc esse ntial m echanism s and hold particula r
att ention during the operati on of th e EU ETS . Their development giv es options flexibility
to both in stallati on ;1I1d M em be r Stares. The guideli ne, ar e de fined ill th e an ne-xes IV and
V o f the D irecti ve 2003 /87 l Ee and focus o n th e baselines co m easu rin g, the p ro vision for
reporting. and th e requirements for veri fying. M ember States are resp o nsible for all the three
acti ons. The E C is like a un biased su pe rintende nt : as well as wi th in o the r part s o f th e E U
ETS fnuue work , its ro le is to ultimat ely e nsure rh.ir M ember Stares ap p ly th e' regulatio ns
correct!y.
Iu the m oni toring p roc ess. the ro le of M ember States is to en su re that th e operato rs
of ce rtai n specified act iv ities hold a gr ee nhouse gas em issio ns pe ru n r an d that th ey m oni tor
and re po rt their e mi ssions o f gree nhouse gases spe ci fied in relat ion co th ose ac tivi tie s. The
guidel in es o n m onitorin g a1',' based o n th e fuel usc, and ca lculated usin g th e formula "/l cli,'-
iry d.na >: Euussionlactor X Ox ulation iactor' wher eas activity dura take acc o un t of th e kind o f
fuel used (no wadays. oxida tio n ( ICtor is still not co nsidered . since th e EU ETS cove rs o nly
C02 emissio n'» .
M ember Sta res have to respect sev era l deadlin es, The e nd o f April is set to be th e dead -
line to su rrender th e form er yea r allowan ces as show n in Figure 1.2. M ember States hav e
to issu e allo wances by the end of Fchruary eac h year ill accordan ce w ith rhc final allocatio n
de cisions, o pe rate th e nati on al regist ry. and also have to p rodu ce' a regul ar an n ual rep ort to
the Comm issio n . The Commission establi shed to adopt standardized or accep ted m ethods as
gu ideli ne s for m onitoring and reportin g; o f em issions, Moreo ver. M emb er Sta tes must take
m easures to coord inate rep orting req u irements w ith allY exi sting reporting requirements in
o rde r to miniun ze th e reporting burden o n bu sinesses.
Figure 1.2 EU ETS deadlines
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T he aim of th e ve rifica tion process is to address th e relia bil ity . credibi lity, and accu racy
o f moni toring sysrenis and th e re po rted da ta and in formation relating to em issio ns. M ember
Sta tes are respo nsible to ensu re th e verificatio n follo w ing th e an nex V p ro visions and to sto p
allowa nc e tran sfers from th ose activ ities w hic h d o not meet rh .... req ui re me nts o f an nex V.
M ember States art' free to ch oose a third party in order to veri fy th e' monito ring and report-
ing acc ording to th e requirement o f com pet ency settle d in th e anne x V .
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T he C ommission operates the Eu rop ean hub of the registry system, and prepares an
an nual report on the basis of Me mber States reports. It closely follows the performance of,
and reviews the expe rience with, the EU Emissions Trading Scheme . The Com mission
has undertaken a review of the monitoring and reporting whi ch is effective since 200R and
w hich takes into aCCOU l!t th e experience of the Phase I and of a stake holde r consultation .
The main changes in th e guidelines are for th em to be closer to the secto r practices' way of
monitoring and report ing th eir activiti es. In addi tion, they need to be more align ed with
reporting mad e by M ember States, whil e veri fication pro cedures of the monitoring and
report ing have been strengthe ned .
10. PRICE ANALYSIS
T he existen ce of a carbo n mark et is date d back to November 2003 though th e EU
ETS began working in j an uary 2005. Between N ovember 2003 and Janu ary 2005 there had
been a sharp oscillation of the price of allow ances co nt racts since at that tim e the Commis-
sion was still evaluating the NAPs and therefo re uncertainty over the real number of allow-
ances was set down .r" The price at the op ening in Janu ary 2005 W J S E8.38 raising to €21.10
at the end of the year. Spike of traded volume, 42.9 million allowances occ ur red on April
2R, 2006 co inciding with the deadline of allowa nce surrender of installation (30 April ) and
peak price of €30. One major result was the clear ove rallocatio n on allowa nces operated in
the NAPs I. This lead to a progressive decrease of the EU ETS allowances (E U A) price in
the market falling from a E4 level at the beginning of the year 2007 to EO.03 in December.
As seen from Figure 1.3, th e fate of the EUA Phase I allowances was sealed as early J S April
2006 and reconfinued th rou gh the verification of 2006 emissions in April 2007. Therefore,
since Octo ber 2006, Ph ase II contracts have bee n the only ones that have deserved any at-
ten tion. Price of Phase I and II are separate, in fact the y are not linked since banking and
bo rrowin g are not allowed across the two Phases.
Over the co urse of 2007, Dec 08 EUA s traded in a range between E12.25 and €2 5.2 8.
The co nt racts closed at € 17.55 on the first tradi ng day of the year, then decli ned to the year 's
lowest point on 20 February. The Dec OR EUA then grew rapidly, at over €4 per month,
until the high of €25.2R was reached on 29 M ay. Subseq uently it fell below € 19 twice, in
Jul y and August, before remain ing largely within the €20-24 range for the rest of the year
and closing at €22.43 on 3 1 December. In 2008 the EU A price showed a steady growth
unt il the middle of the year peaking €2933 0 11 1 J uly. Since Octo ber EU As price started
decreasing reaching 15.30 in th e last trading day of 2008 . The 2009 ope ned wi th a De c 09
EUA price of€15.55 decreasing eve n furth er toward a minimum of €R.06 on February, 12 .
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Figure 1.3 EUA price on the market across Phase I and Phase II (future ECX con-
tracts)
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11. INSIGHTS OF THE FULL STUDY
The EU ETS is a particular case of emissi on tradinp firstly because it treats C 02
em issio ns whi ch are' a global externality : emi tt ing in a ce rtain place' will afl ecr the rest of
the world since thi s compo und spre ads out hoinogeneou sly in th e' atmosphere'. TIll s fact
highli ghts the importan ce of inrernarion al undertaking. because the Eu rop ean effort in co n-
trastin g glo bal warming could be thwart ed when other co unt ries w ould co ntinue emitting
G H G according to bu siness as usual operatio ns. A second major issue is the approa ch o n
emissio ns reducti on : the EU has chose n a quantity approach (cap and trade) rath er than a
pri ce' approach (taxatio n) alrhough n1 a11 )' have been calling tor a better efficiency of the
pri ce' alternati ve . The quantity approach sets 1l1an)' probl em s about allowan ce issuing am ong
act iviti es: emissions data ser ies are needed but at the same time there is a leakage of track
records at activity level. At the sam e tim e ;1 quantity approach ensure th e final objectiv e.
th e total actual emission. since the cap on emissions is fixed : this feature made the quantity
approach preferable to the price on e . The outcome a ll allowances pri ce has seen a marked
volatil ity. which has been making diffi cult the assessme nt o f the o ptimal act io n cho ices at
installatious level. Com pared to the ex pecta tio n befo re laun ching the EU ET S, the price
result ed in a depreciation of allowan ces,
So me lesson s have been learned fiom the first co nunitmcnt tim e period (the Pilot
Ph ase) . The disconnect ion between Ph ase J and 11 becam e clear when it carne out that th e
Pilot Pha se result ed in a allowances ov erallocation. The impossibility of banking allow ances
acr oss the two ph ases pu shed the pri ce o f Phase I EUA s down to zero lev el. In the case that
activities h,rd been allo wed to bank the' allowances surp lus, the occ u rred de preciation would
have not taken place so dramati cally. The reasons w hy a co mpany de cid es to bank allowanc-
e~ are essentially tw o . The first is th e case when expectation tor future pri ces is for a high er
level th an the current on e. The seco nd is to offset un certainty over the future or over sup-
ply, as for exam ple it co uld be the case of more stringent cap during th e thi rd pha se. Banking
and bon-o win g then permits activiti es ro plan their in vestm ents and act ions in the mark er
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environment to a larger time extension stabilizi ng th e price and giv ing co nsistency to th e
sco pe of the EU ETS . Another lesson has been learnt du ring Pha se I: th e EU should aim for
a m or e stringent allowances allocation given the ov er allocatio n of th e pilot phase. This is
what has actually been done for th e curre nt Phase II and it is going to be done in the third
ph ase. Also , th ere sho uld be a better future operation unde r allowances auctio ning rather
than distribution for free . The result o f free allowance distribution has been in so me cases a
so rt of subsidy to so me of the ac tiv ities and this has caused the so called " w indfall profits"
within som e industri es. Economists usually argue that a full auctioning sho uld provide a bet-
ter o peration and efficiency of th e E U ET S. As resp on se, the Commission established th at
au cti oning is going to be the rule starti ng from 2013 , and it will progressively increase its
sha re amongst the allowa nc es distribution methods. This kind of environment should make
the allowance mark et more predictable and help inv estors in planning lon g term strate gy .
The EU ETS is integ rated within the flexible me chanisms of the Kyoto Protocol.
Consequently , each activity under th e EU ETS is allowed to get cred its as results of fi-
nan ced project under the COM. M ore precisely, a ce rta in amount of allow ances deriving
from C O M projects is permitted to co m ply with th e assigned cap. Had th e imposed emis-
sio n reduct ion been quite low (i.e . o n ave rage some percentage points), th e undertaking of
M ember State s was not burdensome. So me of these co unt ries have been allow ed to use a
co nside rable qu antity of C O M credi ts, w hic h ge ne rally are cheaper th an th e EUAs. AJI of
th e activities under th e EU ETS have privileged C D M credits and th ey have m ade a full
use of them. What has happened is th at the emissions reduction needed to com ply with the
E U ETS has been in part produ ced outside Europe, especially in C hina. Despite th e fact
that th e com plianc e with the assign ed ca p is taking place , one could argue that the emi ssions
reduction are not fully occurri ng within E uro pe . At least, o ne co uld infer th at the European
ter ritory driven em issio ns reducti on co m pared to the " Business as U sual" scenario are not
m assive.
The opportunity of finance carbon reduction proje cts combined to the high allowance
pri ce volatility, as well as the low pri ce of these on the market, are not good factors to new
technologies development. This purpose is a maj or goa l of the EU ETS, but the way th at
th e EU ETS has been de veloping has not fostered an y essent ial cha nge . T o understand thi s,
o ne shou ld consider that a co mmo n choice was independently made ac ross the M ember
States: they hav e o ve rburdened th e ene rgy sector with the bulk of th e E U ETS. Therefore,
the energy sector plays a key role within the trading schem e and its actio ns affect the ongo -
ing pr ocess of the whole system. C utt ing emissions in electricity produ ction can be easily
implemented b y sw itc hing the fuel use fro m coal to gas. The potential of abatement is mu ch
bigger than what th e EU ETS cap is no wada ys requ irin g. In the light of the fuel mark ets
trend , it is more co nvenient to electricity compani es th e co al to gas sw itc h rather than re-
spo nding with a widespread R&D o n renewable energy in order to co m ply with th e EU
ETS assigned cap s. The EU ETS is still not a maj or actor into th e ren ewable energy tech-
nologies development, despite its aim is calling for. If the allowance price will result higher
and if inv esto rs will have to do with foreseeable forecasts of the Europ ean and international
co m mi tment o n carbon reduction, new green technologies development mi ght spr ead .
CONCLUSIONS
The EU ETS is still running in th e early stage of its operation . The pilot Phase fini shed
in 2007 and just one of five years of Phase II has been accomplished. N owadays, any j udg-
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menr on th e ET ETS has to be made in light o f this . N evertheless some lesson s have been
learnt and som e credits have to be ackno wledged to th e EU ETS.
Firstly, a carbon mark et like EU ETS had ne ver been created be for e . In (;Ict , in Europe
there was little knowled ge on how to crea te a carbon mark et and there were only a few ex -
perts at th e beginning of the EU ETS impl ementation. In general, politi cians did not kn o w
that mu ch about emission trading, and econo mic interests were limited .
Therefore , a first maj o r accomplishment is that th e EU has been th e first mover in
creating an op erational emissio n trading schem e. T od ay, its share in th e glo bal market is by
far th e biggest one. Lessons from the EU ETS can be appli ed to future clima te negotiati on s
and th e EU , because of its curren t leading position, will playa central role in the inter-
national bargaining arena. The EU ETS has been a successful tool to fulfill the
Kyoto requirements. D espite of w ides pread criticism over the EU ETS, sinc e man y flaw s
exist, one sho uld bear in mind it is succeed ing in respect ing its final goa l, th e EU co nu n it-
m en t to th e Kyoto Pr otocol.
There are also acco mplishm ents ill o the r areas of th e EU ETS.
First, the Pilot Phase lessons produ ced more stringency on Ph ase II NAPs since a
overa llocatio n occurre d during Pha se I. Banking and borrowing are go ing to be allowed
across future ph ases in o rde r to give more price stability in the future .
Second, even if a ce rta in abate ment occur red , it is doubtful w hether the emissio ns
redu ction happened in Europe or not . A co nsiderable part o f emission s red uc tio n is du e to
COM project emissions reductions which take place o utside Europe. The effectiveness
of European territory driven emissions reduction under the EU ETS is therefore
ambiguous.
T hi rd , th e low allowa nc es pr ice as well as th e high pri ce vo latility are likel y not to
induce long period inves tuien ts. Thou gh it is its ma in purpose, the EU ETS has still
not succeeded in boosting new and permanent low carbon and energy effi cient
technologies.
In co nclusio n, one should ackn o wled ge the EU ETS initiative in ex plo ring emission
tradin g. Pilot ph ase lessons have produ ced some changes to wards a be tte r effi ciency of th e
system in the actual seco nd ph ase and overall in th e up coming thi rd ph ase. Skepticism
rem ains about th e effectiveness of foste ring perman ent low carb on and renewabl e ene rgy
technologies.
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